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ABSTRACT
Due to temporary access restrictions, embargoed data can-
not be refreshed to unlimited parties during the embargo
time interval. A solution to mitigate the risk of data loss
has been developed that uses a data dissemination frame-
work, the Timed-Locked Embargo Framework (TLEF), that
allows data refreshing of encrypted instances of embargoed
content in an open, unrestricted scholarly community. TLEF
exploits implementations of existing technologies to \time-
lock" data using timed-release cryptology so that TLEF can
be deployed as digital resources encoded in a complex ob-
ject format suitable for metadata harvesting. The frame-
work successfully demonstrates dynamic record identica-
tion, time-lock puzzle encryption, encapsulation and dissem-
ination as XML documents. We implement TLEF and pro-
vide a quantitative analysis of its successful data harvest of
time-locked embargoed data with minimum time overhead
without compromising data security and integrity.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.7 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: [Digital Li-
braries]
General Terms
Algorithms, Measurement, Design, Performance
Keywords
Repositories, Time Lock, Timed Release, Cryptography
1. INTRODUCTION
The traditional subscription-based journal model provides
information at a cost, making it dicult to aord, espe-
cially by researchers in developing countries. This access
model has served as a catalyst for the Open Access (OA)
movement, which is aimed at providing access to full-text
journal articles online toll-free. Advocates of OA argue the
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subscription-based journal access system hinders free and
open ow of ideas and information, while proponents of the
traditional system argue that it governs and manages the
ow of information, and ensures the maintenance of stan-
dard and structure of this information [16]. A balance needs
to be achieved in order to ensure continuance of ow of
scholarly information and coverage of publication costs by
integrating the advantages contained in both these access
models.
Embargoed access (i.e., Romeo color \yellow" [1]) to aca-
demic material is a hybrid of the restricted, traditional ac-
cess model and the toll-free, Open Access model. It is a tem-
porary restriction imposed by the publisher on the full-text
availability of the latest issues of a journal for a certain time-
period, for example, two years, while the economic value of
the journal is extracted. Individuals and institutions would
have to subscribe to the journal in order to access the lat-
est issues, while the previous issues are available to digital
repositories and individuals without subscription cost. This
access model has been formulated and adopted by various
journals in order to cover publication costs while support-
ing easy information access [18], a factor that was lacking
in the OA cost-recovery model. This allows the publishers
to generate revenue from their subscription business during
the embargo period as well as include the journal articles in
the aggregated databases to improve research accessibility
to the scholarly community.
No single digital preservation strategy is appropriate for
all data types [12]. The fundamental idea of digital preser-
vation is to not rely on a single method of digital preserva-
tion, but to utilize various strategies, such as data refresh-
ing, migration and emulation to ensure data longevity and
integrity. Data refreshing is the copying of bits to dierent
systems that are distributed to various heterogeneous loca-
tions so that, if one copy is destroyed by accidental or mali-
cious means, other copies can be accessed to recover the local
copy of the content. This method of digital preservation can
be applied to preserve content that is freely accessible on-
line, but data that has temporarily restricted, embargoed
access cannot be preserved by this method.
During the embargo period, users and researchers that
have not subscribed to the embargoed journal are unable to
access this restricted information. Therefore, there is a limit
to the number of people who can refresh this embargoed
information, placing it at a risk during this embargo time
interval, which we term the \Preservation Risk Interval".
We mitigate this risk of data loss associated with embar-
goed information by suggesting a data dissemination modelthat allows data refreshing of embargoed content in an open,
unrestricted scholarly community. This is in contrast with
trusted repository models such as CLOCKSS
1 and Poritco
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The Timed-Locked Embargo Framework (TLEF) has been
developed by exploiting implementations of existing tech-
nologies to \time-lock" and encrypt data using Timed-Release
Cryptology [15] so that it can be deployed as digital re-
sources encoded in the MPEG-21 Digital Item Description
Language (DIDL) complex object format [3] to harvesters
interested in harvesting a local copy of content by utilizing
The Open Archives Initiative Protocol for Metadata Har-
vesting (OAI-PMH) [10].
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Timed-Release Crypto
Conventional key-generation algorithms, such as the RSA
encryption algorithm [14, 8], have encryption keys that are
a composite of two large prime numbers, p and q, of approx-
imately equal size
n = pq (1)
where n is used to produce both the public and private keys.
It consists of modular arithmetic used to calculate the fac-
tors of large numbers whose complexity is dependent on the
size of the numbers used. The complexity of the puzzle gen-
erated is just the complexity of the factoring problem. If
brute force were to be applied to break the key, estimated
computation time can be reduced by k, by dedicating k com-
puters to compute the product in parallel. For timed release
crypto, a non-parallelizable key encryption system is pro-
posed,
t = TS (2)
is calculated, T being the amount of time in seconds for
which the puzzle is to be time-locked and S represents the
computational power of the machine. A random key can
be generated using a conventional cryptosystem, where the
key may consist of enough bits to be considered suciently
complicated, and cannot be easily examined and broken.
Calculating inputs n (from equation 1), and a random a,
where 1 < a < n, the encryption key can be encrypted as
Key encryption = Key + a
2t
(mod n): (3)
The output of the time-lock puzzle is thus (n, a, t, encrypted
key, encrypted resource). Input variables, such as p and q
that were used during the computation of the puzzle, are
destroyed.
Without p and q, searching for the key to solve a puzzle
that is encrypted using this method is impractical, rendering
brute force methods of breaking the encryption key non-
parallelizable. The most ecient method of retrieving the
encryption key would be to calculate the variable
b = a
2t
(mod n) (4)
initially used during key encryption. This can be achieved
by sequentially performing t squarings on the value a. This
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requires a dedicated computer performing continuous, se-
quential computation for approximately t time units to de-
crypt the key and thus break the encryption. This encryp-
tion method can be applied with various, carefully selected
values of time unit t to encapsulate the resource for a prede-
termined amount of time, which is equivalent to the resource
embargo period, ensuring that the resource is not released
until the desired computation time t has elapsed.
Another existing approach to timed-release encryption is
the use of a third party intervention, or Trusted Agents
(TA). The use of TAs does not require usage of the receiver's
computation resources. A time-server(s) intercedes as the
negotiator between the content source and the client who is
trying to access the content. During content encryption, a
pair of private keys is produced. The client receives an en-
crypted instance of the content, as well as one of the private
keys, later used for identity verication. The other key from
the pair, required for successful decryption and accessibility
of content, is received from the time-server only after the
required embargo period has elapsed [6, 4]. Although this
approach is possible within TLEF, we do not require the use
of TAs.
2.2 OAI-PMH Resource Harvesting
In prior work, we have extended the OAI-PMH frame-
work to allow for resource harvesting by using complex ob-
ject metadata formats to include the resource (e.g., PDF,
JPEG) either by reference (URI) or by value (base64 en-
coded) [19]. The Apache mod oai module has been designed
to implement OAI-PMH resource harvesting for all les and
URIs on a webserver where the baseURL is the hostname
with \/modoai" appended [17]. It implements all of the
OAI-PMH selective harvesting features such as the from-
until parameters and set parameters. It supports the oai dc
metadata prex that returns technical metadata about the
valid URIs. The oai didl metadata prex is used to return
metadata and the resource itself and is based on a prole of
the MPEG-21 Digital Item Declaration Language [2].
The MPEG-21 DID Abstract Model is complex, but of-
fers the exibility to accurately describe and encompass a
digital object and related metadata. The resource entity
is the actual, identiable datastream, either digital or non-
digital, such as a picture, a video clip, a text document, or a
painting in a museum. A component entity is used to group
together resources and related information about these re-
sources wrapped in a descriptor/statement entity construct.
A DID item is the point of entry for information pertaining
to one resource. It groups together one or more descrip-
tor/statement constructs. Items may contain other items,
each representing one instance of the resource. Figure 1 is an
abstracted view of a resource expressed in MPEG-21 DIDL.
3. THE PRESERVATION RISK INTERVAL
Emerging preservation systems are drifting towards open
architectures where various distributed systems may be net-
worked together to trigger notications and preservation
techniques, such as replication, migration and emulation.
This innovative approach signies that preservation of schol-
arly material via replication is no longer limited to sup-
porting institutions, but is diusing to a much broader and
generic community of interest. This requires a more robust
content dissemination system that can be expanded to in-
clude dissemination of embargoed content.record
header
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last updated
time-locked version
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dc:identiﬁer
Descriptor
http:header
- Content-Length
- Content-Type
- Last-Modiﬁed
- Server
- Date
Component Resource     base64
Resource     reference
datestamp
setSpec
metadata
DIDL
Item
Figure 1: Structure of a resource expressed in
MPEG-21 DIDL Abstract Model.
Consider a repository of journal articles where the older
issues are open access but the latest issues are embargoed.
The records contained in the latest issue need to be identied
and time-locked before data dissemination. The embargo
period of the records would begin at the time of article pub-
lication. The repository provides a predetermined number
of instance updates of each record with successively weaker
time-locks. Thus, every record update is a weaker time-
locked encryption that requires less time to break and con-
sequently access the data. The last instance update would
be an unlocked version of the record at the end of the em-
bargo time period.
Time-locking embargoed records in an institutional repos-
itory for the purpose of digital preservation during data dis-
semination introduces an overhead. This is the time re-
quired to unlock the records in order to eectively access
a decrypted version of the records. The establishment of
nomenclature, as described in Table 1, is thus imperative for
assessing the amount of time required to eectively unlock
and access the time-locked records held in the repository.
Let us assume the existence of a repository R that consists
of a set of records such as R = faw;bx:::kzg, where the sub-
script for each record instance is the remaining embargo time
period for that record. This repository R contains an initial
number of R(0) records at time i = 0. The records are ini-
tially time-locked for a total embargo period embargolength,
with a predetermined number of embargodecrement embar-
goed record updates. The embargo period begins at the time
of record publication, which is at datestamp embargostart.
This repository is updated at every time unit i when the
existing records in the repository are updated with a new
embargo period time-lock. All records in the repository will
be updated with a new embargo period with every reposi-
i time unit
R(i) number of records in repository at time i
Rupdate record updates to repository per time unit
R(0) initial number of records in repository at i = 0
H(i) number of records at harvester at time i
Hupdate harvester update frequency per time unit.
Hupdate = 0.5 means data harvest every 2 units
H(0) initial number of records at harvester at i = 0
publisherstart publisher-imposed global datestamp
after which all records published in the are
repository embargoed
embargostart creation date for embargoed record
embargoend end date for record embargo period, after time
period embargolength has elapsed
embargolength embargo time period for each record
embargodecrement number of times the record time-lock is
decreased (i.e., total number of record updates)
rx record with embargo period = x, with x = 0 as
an unlocked record
Table 1: Variable denitions.
a3 b3 c3 d3 e3 i = 0 time i = 0
with R(0) = 5 records
a2 b2 c2 d2 e2 f3 i = 1 5 records updated, 1
new record published
a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f2 g3 i = 2 6 records updated, 1
new record published
a0 b0 c0 d0 e0 f1 g2 h3 i = 3 unlocked records
at i = embargolength = 3
. . .
a0 b0 c0 ...p0 q0 r1 s2 t3 i = 15 Rupdate  embargolength
= 3 records locked
8i > embargolength
Table 2: Behavior of an active repository
with embargoed records, with R(0)=5 records,
embargolength=3 months and Rupdate=1 record.
tory update. The repository also grows linearly, by Rupdate
records with every update.
For example, consider a scenario where repository R has:
R(0) = 5, Rupdate = 1 (one new record is published with ev-
ery repository update), total embargo period for each record
embargolength = 3 months, and embargodecrement = 3 (the
number of times the record time-lock is decreased, before
an unlocked instance is published). Table 2 describes the
number of records and their embargo period with respect to
time.
As the repository begins with an initial number of records
R(0), which have been time-locked for time period
embargolength, the total amount of time spent on unlocking
the records would dier with the time elapsed (i). If the
elapsed time is less than the time-lock period
embargolength, then the repository would not yet contain
any unlocked records. The amount of time required to un-
lock the records would then be the sum of the embargo pe-
riod of the initial R(0) number of records and the records
added to R since i = 0 would be (8embargolength   i > 0):
R(0)(embargolength   i) +
i 1 X
k=0
Rupdate(embargolength   k).
(5)
If the elapsed time is more than the embargo period, theRepository Time Harvester
a3 b3 c3    i = 0 a3 b3 c3
a2 b2 c2 d3 i = 1 a3 b3 c3
a1 b1 c1 d2 e3    i = 2 a1 b1 c1d2 e3
a0 b0 c0 d1 e2 f3 i = 3 a1 b1 c1d2 e3
a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3    i = 4 a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3
a0 b0 c0 d0 e0 f1 g2 h3 i = 5 a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3
;    i = 6 a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3
; i = 7 a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3
;    i = 8 a0 b0 c0 d0 e1 f2 g3
Table 3: Repository with R(0) = 3 records,
embargolength = 3 and Rupdate = 1. Harvester with
Hupdate = 0:5. Repository dies at i = 6.
initial R(0) records would be unlocked, requiring computa-
tion on the time-locked records added to the repository since
time i. An embargo period less than or equal to zero refers
to an unlocked record. Thus, the computation time required
to access these records would be (8embargolength   i > 0):
embargolength 1 X
k=0
Rupdate(embargolength   k): (6)
Therefore, at time i = 15, the computation time required
to access all the records available in the repository, since
3   15 < 0, = r1 + s2 + t3, there will be embargolength=
3 time-locked records, embargoed for time period 1, 2 and
3 respectively, which will require 1 + 2 + 3 = 6 months of
dedicated computation to be accessed.
Table 3 shows a repository with R(0) = 3, embargolength =
3 and Rupdate = 1. The repository dies at i = 6 and does
not come back online. A harvester with Hupdate = 0:5
has been harvesting the repository (\  " indicates a har-
vesting operation). The harvester has unlocked versions of
records a;b;c, and once it determines the repository is not
coming back online it can begin to break the encryption
on records e;f;g, with only record h permanently lost. If
the repository had disseminated only unembargoed records,
then e;f;g would have also been lost to the harvester.
The repository example discussed here can be further ana-
lyzed to formulate an embargoed record identication method.
The active repository contains records with publisher-imposed
embargo time period of embargolength = 3 months, and the
repository mandates embargodecrement = 3 updates of each
embargoed record, then the embargoed records are updated
with a weaker timelock every
embargolength
embargodecrement
= 1 month.
This results in a total of three instance updates. The em-
bargo period inception of each embargoed record is from
the publication, or creation date, which is embargostart.
Therefore, the end of the embargo period, embargoend for a
record, can be easily projected by adding the embargo pe-
riod embargolength to the datestamp embargostart. A record
under embargo can be identied by comparing the dates-
tamp at the time of data dissemination with the publisher-
imposed, global publisherstart datestamp and the projected
embargoend datestamp. If the record is identied as under
embargo, then the remaining time of the embargo period
of that record is calculated. A predetermined number of
embargodecrement updates of the record (three in this exam-
ple) with decreasing time-lock are provided. The remaining
embargo period of the record is also used to calculate the
number of updates of the record (e.g., second of three up-
dates). This determines the complexity of the record encryp-
tion. Therefore, a decrease in the remaining embargo period
results in the creation of a weaker encryption of the record
that would require less computation time to break the en-
cryption. Once the required embargo period has elapsed, an
unencrypted instance of the record is created during content
dissemination. For instance, if a record r3 is published on
Wed, 19 Sep 2007 09:58:19 GMT, the next update would be
available after one month has elapsed, on Fri, 19 Oct 2007
09:58:19 GMT. An unlocked instance of the record would
be available after the embargo period has elapsed, which
would end on Wed, 19 Dec 2007 09:58:19 GMT. Algorithm
1 illustrates the embargo record identication process based
on datestamp comparison of the record and the start of the
embargo time period.
Algorithm 1 The Embargoed Record Identication process
invoked during content dissemination
1: for all records do
2: if (embargostart > publisherstart) and (embargostart <
embargoend) then
3: calculate remaining embargolength for the record
4: calculate record instance update
5: calculate encryption complexity
6: calculate new record datestamp
7: end if
8: end for
4. IMPLEMENTATION IN MOD OAI
In response to a GetRecord or ListRecords mod oai HTTP
request with metadata prex oai didl, the embargoed iden-
tication, encryption and encapsulation components incor-
porated in the Apache module are invoked. Algorithm 2
describes the sequence and interaction of these components.
Algorithm 2 Interaction of various record data and meta-
data creation components
1: if (Request Verb = ListRecords) or (Request Verb = GetRecord)
then
2: Records Index Creation
3: for all records do
4: Preservation Metadata Creation
5: Metadata Encapsulation in MPEG-21 DIDL data item
6: if record is under Embargo then
7: Dynamic Embargoed Record Identication
8: Record Datestamp modication
9: Dynamic Embargoed Record Encryption
10: Dynamic Embargoed Record Encapsulation
11: end if
12: if Include Resource by-value then
13: Resource Encapsulation in MPEG-21 DIDL component
14: if record is under Embargo then
15: Resource MD5 hash Encapsulation in MPEG-21 DIDL
data descriptor
16: Puzzle Parameters Encapsulation in MPEG-21 DIDL
data descriptor
17: end if
18: else
19: Include Resource reference in MPEG-21 DIDL compo-
nent
20: end if
21: end for
22: end if
4.1 Dynamic Embargoed Record
Identiﬁcation
The general solution for embargoed record identication
has been further developed to handle dynamic record iden-tication. Algorithm 3 has been incorporated in mod oai to
identify records that are under embargo.
Algorithm 3 Dynamic Embargoed Record Identication
Process incorporated within mod oai
1: publisherstart = Global Zulu date when embargo period for each
record begins
2: embargolength = 365 fembargo time period for each record in
daysg
3: embargodecrement = 12 fnumber of embargoed record updatesg
4: lockStart = startDate in unix seconds
5: lockDuration = embargolength in seconds
6: for all records do
7: currentTime = current date in unix seconds finput current
date from the systemg
8: fileTime = current record modied date,embargostart, in
unix seconds
9: if (fileTime < lockStart) or (fileTime  (currentTime  
lockDuration)) then
10: the record is not under embargo
11: else
12: if ((fileTime + lockDuration) > currentTime) then
13: noOfSecsInInterval = (lockDuration/p)
14: elapsedTimeFraction = (currentTime  
fileTime=lockDuration)
15: intervalNo = elapsedTimeFraction * p
16: elapsedLockTime = intervalNo *
noOfSecsInInterval
17: intervalsLeft = p - intervalNo
18: lockTimeLeft = intervalsLeft * noOfSecsInInterval
flockTimeLeft is used to linearly interpolate the antici-
pated computation timeUnitg
fcalculate new timestamp of the le according to last
interval updateg
19: newTimestamp = elapsedLockTime + fileTime
fcalculating next updateg
20: nextUpdate = (intervalNo + 1) *
noOfSecsInInterval
21: nextTimestamp = nextUpdate + fileTime
22: convert newTimestamp and nextTimestamp integer
variables from seconds to Zulu time
23: print intervalNo as the current version of the record,
out of a total of embargodecrement versions
24: print the nextTimestamp in Zulu time as the next an-
ticipated update timestamp
25: print lockTimeLeft as the anticipated computation time
required to unlock the time-locked puzzle
26: end if
27: end if
28: end for
The publisher-imposed start date for the embargo period
of each record has been included in the mod oai congu-
ration le as a variable that can be modied and set by
the user accordingly. The duration of the embargo period,
with a granularity of days, has also been established as a
known variable. The number of instance updates, or inter-
vals during these updates, is also a known variable and is
included in the conguration le as required input. These
variables can be adjusted to modify the eective embargo
time period for the records and the number of instance up-
dates desired for each record under embargo. Algorithm
3 and remaining examples of embargoed record identica-
tion and encryption are based upon an embargolength =
365 days, with embargodecrement = 12 instance updates for
each record. A later version of each record would correspond
to a less complex time-lock puzzle that would require less
computation time to break the encryption.
Algorithm 3 computes time values in unix seconds to en-
able mathematical manipulation on time values and then
converts the time in seconds back to ISO 8061 time before
being included in XML output. After identifying a record as
under embargo, the algorithm rst calculates the time frac-
tion that has elapsed since the start of the embargo period.
This fraction is then converted into an integer value that
represents the current number of the instance update. This
interval number is then used to determine the eective re-
maining lock-time, on which the complexity of the time-lock
puzzle is dependent.
The remaining lock-time in seconds is the computation
time it should take to access the record once it has been
time-locked. The timed-release cryptology algorithm re-
quires an integer input value that determines the complexity
of the record encryption. Thus, various tests, described dur-
ing system evaluation in section 5, have been conducted to
linearly interpolate and map the remaining lock-time with
an appropriate integer value that is used as the input for the
embargoed record encryption algorithm.
4.2 Dynamic Embargoed Record Encryption
The LCS35 Time Capsule Crypto-Puzzle [13], created in
1999, was designed to take about 35 years of linear compu-
tation to solve. The puzzle takes into consideration Moore's
Law [11], and anticipates that computational power will
double approximately every two years. The puzzle follows
the future trend described by SEMATECH National Tech-
nology Roadmap for Semiconductors [7] that predicts an ex-
ponential increase in processing speed by a factor of 13 from
1999 until 2012. A further increase in speed by a factor of
5 until 2034 has been estimated and taken into account in
the algorithm. In order to ensure the computation time of
35 years, it is assumed that a faster computer will be used
every year to perform the required sequential computation
to break the LCS35 puzzle.
Algorithm 4 Dynamic Embargoed Record Encryption al-
gorithm incorporated within mod oai
1: squaringsPerTimeunit = 3000
2: secondsPerTimeunit = 1800
3: squaringsFirstTimeunit = secondsPerTimeunit 
squaringsPerTimeunit
4: t = 0
5: for i = 1 till i  timeUnit do
6: t = t + squaringsFirstTimeunit fthe number of squarings
depends on timeUnit. t increases linearlyg
7: end for
8: primelength = 1024 fgenerating RSA parametersg
9: twoPower = shift left primelength(1)
10: prand = 3
11: qrand = 5
12: p = 5
13: q = 5 f5 has maximal order modulo 2
k (see Knuth)g
14: p = (p
prand) mod twoPower
15: p = get next prime of p
16: q = (q
qrand) mod twoPower
17: q = get next prime of q
18: n = p  q
19: pMinus1 = p   1
20: qMinus1 = q   1
21: phi = pMinus1  qMinus1
22: u = (2
t) mod phi fGenerating nal puzzle value wg
23: w = (2
u) mod n fconvert the le in Base256g
24: while buffer = read a char from le do
25: c = buffer fconvert character into ascii equivalent integer
valueg
26: secret = shift left(secret)
27: secret = secret + c
28: end while
29: z = (secret)xor(w) fprint puzzle parametersg
30: print n and t parameters in a string variable
31: print extra information required to break the encryption
32: Base64 encode(z)
33: print the puzzle parameters and Base64 encoded z in XML doc-
umentrecord
Descriptor
dc:identiﬁer
Descriptor
http:header
- Content-Length
- Content-Type
- Last-Modiﬁed
- Server
- Date
header identiﬁer
last updated
time-locked version datestamp
setSpec
metadata
DIDL
Item
dc:creator         md5sum
dc:description  md5sum hash value
Descriptor
time-locked record description
Descriptor
Component Resource     base64
Resource     reference
Figure 2: MPEG-21 DIDL structure of an embar-
goed record
Algorithm 4 has been programmed in the C programming
language and incorporated in mod oai. It takes the variable
timeUnit as input and outputs the time-locked instance of
the record along with the puzzle variables n and t required
to break the puzzle, along with the instructions on how to
break the puzzle. The GMP C library
3 has been used to
declare the large numbers produced in the algorithm. The
logic of the timed-release cryptographic algorithm has been
preserved. It has been amended to accept binary les as
input, to permit all les to be accessed and encrypted ir-
respective of their MIME type. To allow les with various
MIME types to be time-locked, it was not possible to append
or include the seed value b in the le during data encryp-
tion. This implementation does not take Moore's law into
account because of the anticipated relatively short embargo
periods (e.g., 1-2 years). Instead, near-horizon values are
chosen as described in section 5. The MD5 cryptographic
hash function has been used to create 32-character hash val-
ues of the le to verify the integrity of the le contents upon
decryption.
4.3 Dynamic Embargoed Record
Encapsulation
The encrypted instance of the embargoed record is encap-
sulated in MPEG-21 DIDL XML document. This document
reects the appropriate changes in the included metadata to
be identied as an encrypted instance of the record. Figure 2
is the resulting DIDL document structure that encapsulates
data and metadata pertaining to a record under embargo.
The two occurrences of the last-modied datestamp of
the record have been updated in the resulting XML docu-
ment to reect the latest embargoed record instance. This
datestamp represents the last instance when the record was
3http://gmplib.org/
encrypted with the latest embargo period and has been up-
dated in the DIDL header section, in ISO 8061 [9] date for-
mat, and in the http metadata descriptor, in RFC 822 [5]
date format. The resource, in either base64 format or refer-
enced by a URI, has been relocked with a weaker time-lock.
The MD5 checksum of an unlocked instance of the record
has been included in a descriptor in the response to provide
sucient information for integrity verication upon record
decryption. It has been encapsulated in a DIDL descriptor
element.
An extra descriptor DIDL element is introduced to iden-
tify the record as time-locked and encapsulates related in-
formation such as the instance of the embargoed record up-
date, the original start of the record embargo, and when an
unlocked instance of the record can be anticipated. It also
provides the variables and method to break and access the
encrypted record, and includes information on the estimated
computation hours required to achieve this task.
The mod oai Apache module allows the record resource to
be included in the XML document by reference as well as by
value. The reference URL pertaining to an encrypted record
has been modied to be directed through a script that al-
lows the le accessed to be time-locked before data display.
It provides the same information included in the DIDL doc-
ument required to unlock and access the encrypted record
instance. When dereferencing the URI of an embargoed
record, the resulting representation displays the resource in
decimal values without base64 encoding, which is the orig-
inal output of the timed-release puzzle. The returned page
reiterates the information included in the XML document
that is required to decrypt the accessed encrypted record:
This version of the record is 7 of 12 separate encryptions, each of
which is successively easier to break.
It will take approximately 3650 hours of computation to break this
time-lock.
The next update will be available on 2008-01-16T20:56:15Z.
Crypto-Puzzle for LCS35 Time Capsule.
Puzzle parameters (all in decimal): n = 398399 t = 264600000.
z =
313239174518025552773909388461801735302388...
893375562056859914777144518879488573607906...
742437030171894184996228671834511813009803...
(many lines deleted for space)
To solve the puzzle, rst compute w = 2
(2t) (mod n).
Then exclusive-or the result with z.
(Right-justify the two strings rst).
The result is the secret message (8 bits per character).
5. SELECTING T
The timed-release cryptography algorithm has been de-
signed to take an integer variable timeUnit as an input.
This timeUnit value linearly increases the complexity of
the puzzle by increasing the t value in the 2
2t
computa-
tion performed to break the le time-lock. A puzzle corre-
sponding to a higher t value requires more time to break
the encryption. This decryption time can be mapped with
embargolength, the remaining embargo period of the le that
was calculated during dynamic embargoed record identica-
tion. Due to the mathematical properties of this cryptogra-
phy method, the time required to break the time-lock puzzle
is directly dependent upon the speed of the processor used
to perform the required calculations. An appropriate value
of timeUnit can be selected to accurately calculate the puz-
zle complexity and the time required to break and access
the encryption in relation to the desired processor speed.
A correlation between the remaining embargo period, thet value and embargolength on a particular computer system
can be calculated by assimilating the results of the timed-
release algorithm. To compute this correlation, the timed-
release cryptography algorithm has been executed with in-
creasing values of timeUnit to create puzzles of increasing
complexity. These puzzles have then been broken to deter-
mine the amount of time required to break the time-lock
and subsequently access the encrypted content. A table of
increasing timeUnit values and their corresponding decryp-
tion time can be created to describe this dependency. This
unlock time can then be mapped to embargolength, the re-
maining embargo period for a record, to ensure that the
decryption time is no less than embargolength.
The linear correlation between embargolength, the unlock
time required, and tU, the timeUnit value, to be used for
record encryption can be described as:
f(x) =
embargolength
tU
(7)
where x is the processor speed of the machine utilized for
computation. An increase in processor speed x would result
in a decrease in embrgolength. Puzzles have been created
using this timed-release algorithm on various computer sys-
tems to establish a linear correlation between embargolength
and tU, and to determine and analyze this variant f(x) value
diering with each system speed x.
Four x values have been empirically calculated. A Sun
Solaris cluster of 31 nodes has been utilized for performance
testing during the research. 26 nodes of this cluster have
the processing speed of x = 1:6 GHz, and ve nodes have
a processing speed of x = 1:8 GHz. Two machines with
a computation speed of x = 1 GHz and x = 0:75 GHz
respectively, have also been utilized to compute and compare
the time required to break the timed-release cryptography
puzzle.
An identical text le was used by these machines as input
to create puzzles of varying complexity by using the timed-
release algorithm, starting with the input value timeUnit =
1. This timeUnit value is used by the timed-release algo-
rithm, as described in section 4.2, to calculate the t value
used for data encryption, which remains unchanged through-
out the tests performed. As described in Algorithm 4, tU
linearly increases the puzzle t value. Each increment in the
tU value increases the t value by a value of 5,400,000. There-
fore, tU, the timeUnit value used as input in the algorithm
as t = 5400000tU.
The created time-lock puzzles of varying complexity are
then broken to record the amount of decryption time on
the particular system. The accumulated values of eective
timeUnit values and unlock time embargolength have been
plotted to demonstrate a linear correlation between puzzles
with increasing complexity and unlock time embargolength.
All time values have been recorded in seconds time granu-
larity. Figure 3 is a plot of the datapoints gathered by tests
performed on the four classes of machines that demonstrate
the linear relationship between embargolength and tU.
From the graph in Figure 3 and the corresponding f(x)
values of the four x classes of machines in Table 4, it can
be discerned that the rate of increase of a particular class
of machine can be projected from any one selected class of
machine. An increase in the rate of change f(x) for a given
class of machine is inversely proportional to the computation
speed x of that class.
Figure 3: Unlock time of a time-locked puzzle with
increasing complexity on four classes of machines
x Class (GHz) f(x) value
0.75 2302.16
1 1727.61
1.6 1079.14
1.8 959.78
Table 4: Corresponding f(x) values of the four x
classes of machines.
With the known pair of values for x = 0:75, the f(x) value
of a 1GHz machine can be projected using this inverse pro-
portion relation as
0:75
1
=
f(1)
2302:16
(8)
f(1) = 0:75  2302:16 (9)
= 1726:62 (10)
The f(xk) value corresponding to the known xk compu-
tation speed can be projected with:
f(xk) =
f(xj)  xj
xk
: (11)
A calculated f(x) value for a particular class of machine
that is closer to the actual, calculated f(x) value in Table 4
indicates the observance of Moore's Law, whereby conclud-
ing that this inverse correlation can be utilized to project
the f(x) value for various classes of machines.
For instance, if a le is to be locked for two years on a 2.5
GHz machine, an appropriate f(x) value corresponding to
this processing speed x can be calculated. This f(x) value is
the rate of change for unlock time with respect to increasing
values of time Unit and can be represented as equation 7.
Substituting f(x) with its calculation in equation 11 gives us
the new formula for determining unlock time embargolength;
embargolength =
f(xj)  xj
x
tU (12)
where f(xj) and xj are a known x-f(x) value pair and xFigure 4: File size variance of website content har-
vested during mod oai performance testing
is the processing speed for which a rate of change is to be
projected. With a known unlock time value, equivalent to
embargolength, a corresponding timeUnit value to be used
as input in the timed-release cryptography algorithm can be
calculated as
tU =
x
f(xj)  xj
embargolength: (13)
Substituting the class 1 value as xj, and its calculated
f(xj) value would result in
tU =
x
1727:61
embargolength (14)
that can be used as a benchmark to project the timeU-
nit value for the desired class of machine with a known
x. This formula can be utilized to calculate tU for known
embargolength on the machine selected for data encryption
during data dissemination via mod oai. Thus, the tU value
required to time-lock a le for embargolength = 2 years,
which is 63115200 seconds, on machine x = 2:5 GHz can be
calculated as
tU =
2:5
1727:61
63115200 (15)
= 9133: (16)
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A modied version of mod oai was tested with a collec-
tion of 525 les that total 17.3 MB of data. 63% of the
les are text les of various sizes, and the average size of
each le is approximately 33 KB. Figure 4 shows the size of
each le in relation with the number of les comprising the
website. Baseline harvests were done with no time-locks,
and then harvests were d one with embargolength of one
year. A variable, modoai encode size, contained in the mod-
ule's conguration le, determines the maximum allowable
le size for inclusion by-value in the resulting XML doc-
ument. It subsequently controls the size of each resulting
XML document during data dissemination. Therefore, dif-
fering harvest times of the website with increasing values
of modoai encode size have been collected to analyze the
performance of mod oai with increasing quantity of time-
locked data in the resulting XML document in response to
a mod oai ListRecords request.
modoai encode size Responses None locked All locked
(Bytes) (sec) (sec)
150,000 69 16.2 555
300,000 35 9.5 635
500,000 24 7.6 913
700,000 16 5.4 988
1,000,000 13 4.5 937
5,000,000 6 4.5 3648
10,000,000 6 4.5 10380
15,000,000 6 4.7 10962
Table 5: Wallclock harvest times of website with
varied modoai encode size and embargoed content.
As shown in Table 5 and Figure 5, an increase in the
modoai encode size results in a larger XML document re-
sponse and fewer number of total XML document responses
to a ListRecords request. An increase in modoai encode size
results in an increase in the number of les included by-
value via base64 data inclusion in the data harvest. With
no data under embargo, there is no lock-time overhead, and
the increase in the modoai encode size favors the increase in
by-value data inclusion and results in faster data dissemina-
tion.
With the entire website content under embargo, an in-
crease in modoai encode size leads to an increase in the har-
vest time due to the time overhead required to lock the
increasing volume of data to be included in the response
as base64 datastream. The entire website content is har-
vested as a base64 encoded datastream in 3.2 hours, with
modoai encode size set to 10 MB.
Figure 5: Comparison of harvest times between un-
locked and time-locked website content during dy-
namic data dissemination
An increase in by-value content inclusion during content
dissemination leads to an exponential increase in harvest
time. The le contents of the website were individually time-
locked, with embargo time-period embargolength = one year,
to determine that the amount of time required to time-locka le is dependent upon the size of the le. Figure 6 is the
resulting graph representing the time required to time-lock
individual les, in log representation, in relation to their
respective le size.
Figure 6: Time required to individually time-lock
les contained in the test website
7. CHUNKED ENCRYPTION
Since time-locking was discovered to have a run-time com-
plexity of O(n
2), an optimization was needed to feasibly
handle typical le sizes. For example, a le of size 100 KB
on a 1.8 GHz machine requires 3 seconds to be time-locked,
whereas a 200KB le requires 13 seconds. If the 200KB le
is divided into two \chunks" of 100 KB each, the 200 KB
le can be time-locked, without parallelism, in six seconds,
resulting in a 54% improvement. During the decryption the
chunks can be decrypted individually then concatenated to
reproduce the original le.
This \chunked" time-lock data model has been included in
mod oai to benet from this observed speedup during dur-
ing dynamic data dissemination. A chunk size of 10 KB
has been selected for implementation in mod oai since we
empirically determined it requires about 0.2 CPU seconds
for time-lock computation. Any le residing in the website
with le size greater than 10 KB that is to be included as
an encrypted datastream in the resulting XML document
has been divided into 10 KB chunks to achieve faster en-
cryption time. The algorithm still runs in O(n
2) time, but
with a more favorable constant. Table 6 and gure 7 shows
the results of harvesting with 10KB chunks, as well as the
times required to harvest without chunking, and without
time-locking. The times are the mean of ve separate har-
vests.
A comparison of the plotted times between regular time-
lock encryption and chunked encryption reveals a 70 speedup
in harvest times. Even though an exponential increase in
harvest time is still observed, the chunked harvest time curve
has been pushed to the right for common le sizes, resulting
in a slower increase in exponential harvest time. As observed
from the graph, with modoai encode size set to 15 MB, chun-
ked encryption results in a speedup of 70, with the harvest
time reduced from 3.2 hours to only 2.6 minutes. This time
Figure 7: Harvest times of website using no data
time-lock, regular time-lock and chunked time-lock
encryption during dynamic data dissemination.
modoai encode size Responses Chunked  Speedup
(Bytes) (sec) (sec)
150,000 70 99 7.7 6
300,000 38 101 12.4 6
500,000 24 102 7.9 9
700,000 16 103 6.5 10
1,000,000 13 108 10.7 9
5,000,000 6 161 16.1 23
10,000,000 6 160 16.2 65
15,000,000 6 156 16.9 70
Table 6: Wallclock harvest times of website with
using \chunked" time-lock encryption.
penalty for disseminating embargoed content is within the
realistic, feasible range of website harvest time.
The MPEG21 DIDL document format represented in Fig-
ure 2 has been modied to reect the inclusion of chunked
time-lock encryption. In this optimization, the size of each
encrypted chunk is set to 10 KB. Every le of size greater
than 10 KB has been divided into 10 KB chunks and indi-
vidually encrypted. Each le chunk has been encapsulated
into one component. Therefore, each chunked encrypted le,
contained in a DIDL record entity, contains multiple com-
ponents. Chunked records in the exported XML document
can be identied by their le size, as well as the number of
components contained in each record.
Each record component needs to be identied for accurate
reordering, decryption and reassembly of contained data
chunks into one le. These components have been asso-
ciated with Identiers in increasing lexicographical order,
which have been encapsulated in an identier entity within
each component. A descriptor has also been inserted in each
component to provide additional information regarding the
total number of chunks contained in the record to ensure
that each isolated component contains sucient informa-
tion required for reassembly of chunks into one le. This
modied document model still contains the original record
identier and related metadata for record identication.record
Descriptor
dc:identiﬁer
Descriptor
http:header
- Content-Length
- Content-Type
- Last-Modiﬁed
- Server
- Date
header identiﬁer
last updated time-locked version datestamp
setSpec
metadata
DIDL
Item
dc:creator         md5sum
dc:description  md5sum hash value
Descriptor time-locked record description
Descriptor
Component
Descriptor chunked record information
Descriptor         dc:identiﬁer
Descriptor         time-locked base64
Component
Descriptor chunked record information
Descriptor         dc:identiﬁer
Descriptor         time-locked base64
.
.
.
Figure 8: MPEG-21 DIDL Document of a record
time-locked using chunked encryption.
8. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced the \Preservation Risk Interval" prob-
lem associated with embargoed content caused due to lim-
ited diusion of embargoed scholarly material within the
digital library community. The Time-Locked Embargo Frame-
work introduces the identication of embargoed content and
calculates the required complexity of the time-lock puzzle to
be created for that content. During the integration of time-
lock puzzles into mod oai, an initial system evaluation re-
vealed that the amount of time required to create time-lock
puzzles during dynamic DIDL document creation increases
exponentially with the size of the embargoed le. This ex-
ponential increase in time overhead has been reduced by
splitting the les into 10 KB data chunks for faster encryp-
tion and harvest time. The framework has also modied the
MPEG-21 DIDL complex object format utilized by mod oai
to accurately encapsulate chunked embargoed content and
related metadata. With the use of the expanded mod oai
module, resources under embargo can be exchanged between
a much broader scholarly community for the purpose of dig-
ital preservation as well as content diusion.
Optimum chunk size should be investigated further. 10KB
was empirically determined for the class of machines we
used, but other values or approaches should be investigated.
Alternate approaches could include using parallel machines
for time-locking, or \pre-locking" popular content prior to
distribution (the current implementation dynamically locks
on dissemination, trading time for space by not requiring
the overhead of cache maintenance). There could also be
hybrid approaches where the content is locked with con-
ventional encryption and the only the keys are time-locked.
Furthermore, the time-lock approach could be dened as an
HTTP \Content-Encoding" (like \gzip" or \deate") and
be used outside of OAI-PMH.
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